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The Perilous Slog of Asymmetric Warfare: A Better Way 
Forward in Afghanistan[1] 
Nick M. Masellis[2] 
Insurgency is the most widespread form of warfare today. 
David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency[3] 
Introduction 
The situation on the ground in Afghanistan remains tenuous. Despite a strategy that has been 
under the auspices of a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign—as presented 
by General McChrystal, officially sanctioned by President Obama during his historic address at 
West Point, and likely to be continued under the command of General Petraeus—military and 
political progress have been nominal relative to the resources committed. The latest operations in 
Helmand Province illustrate this point. Though initial reports suggest that coalition forces were 
effective in clearing the area—liberating villages and expunging Taliban resistance—the Taliban 
have been successful in what Rajiv Chandrasekaran describes as being able to wait-out the initial 
phases, and then strike against the “soft underbelly” of coalition operations—slowly reasserting 
their presence in the area by launching sporadic kinetic strikes, as well as a staunch “campaign of 
intimidation” toward the local population.[4]  
With such a security and political package meant to pacify the area—the hallmarks of General 
McChrystal’s plan—the “box has come up empty.”[5] To paraphrase comments made by Dr. 
Andrew Bacevich, the events of the first five-to-six months of this year were meant to 
demonstrate the feasibility of the McChrystal strategy. Marja was the place where that strategy 
was going to be rolled-out, but it has thus far not paid any grand dividends.[6] Afghanistan, 
therefore, exhibits the quintessential problem-set found in other historical COIN experiences, 
beckoning the revelation of past lessons drawn from conflicts in Malaya, Algeria and various 
other past conflict zones. All of those cases provide contextual pillars of military, social, political 
and economic solvents which have assisted to eradicate an array of virulent and endemic 
problems within a particular society. But the immediate problem is not so much what is needed 
over an extended period of time to address these key areas of COIN, but what remains politically 
feasible as the December 2011 review date approaches.  
Though General Petraeus recently assured that the date set is meant to “review the conditions,” 
as opposed to “turning off the lights” during his recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, there has undoubtedly been increased skepticism over the U.S. commitment in 
Afghanistan, arguably enhancing the Taliban information campaign[7]—suggesting that they 




sheer extent of difficulties inherent in conducting COIN operations, as Dr. John A. Nagl, 
president of the Center for a New American Security, points out—“counterinsurgency campaigns 
are messy and slow—the one in Afghanistan will be no different”— but the granular and unique 
cultural dynamism across the entire landscape makes this situation particularly daunting.[8] 
Therefore any recipe for success will be incredibly challenging—politically and economically—
for any modern nation-state, especially one on an arbitrary timeline. However, a strategy that 
aims at lessening the footprint may be the most effective means to support the Afghans over a 
longer period of time, while still having the capability to effectively disrupt and dismantle active 
Al Qaeda cells.  
How can this effectively be accomplished? First, it’s important to note that all elements of 
statecraft will still be necessary in order to address the broad spectrum of issues related to COIN 
operations. Typically, such comprehensive resolve toward stabilizing zones wrought in conflict 
originates from institutions that fall outside the realm of military affairs (e.g., the State 
Department, USAID, etc.).[9] Up until now, there have been various programs like that of 
Afghan-Hands, Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) and 
various other interagency and reconstruction measures that have assisted in pacifying some areas 
of the country. But in many other cases, the effects have been mediocre. The fact of the matter is 
that Afghanistan is a country that has existed, over the past 30 years, in a constant state of 
turmoil, with little-to-no infrastructure and a populace that is mostly illiterate. And though new 
hopes exist with regard to newly discovered natural resources, there should be no illusions of 
how long it will take for Afghanistan to define itself as stable.[10] There is no silver bullet.  
Therefore, what type of approach is most malleable for success, as conventional forces 
potentially draw down in the coming months and where the security situation may be untenable 
for interagency and NGO groups to continue operations on the scale that they are at present?[11] 
Since there remains anhe unparalleled ability of the U.S. military to deploy, maintain logistics, 
and sustain an overseas force,, I argue that smaller elements of U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) should perform the majority functions of pacification, while serving as an economy-of-
force measure. This is the most appropriate way forward during this transitional phase, given our 
planned conventional withdrawal and recent, abrupt change of command.  
In this article, I first review Ivan Arreguin-Toft’s strategic interaction (SI) theory, which suggests 
that when strong actors utilize a differing force-on-force approach against weak actors, the strong 
actor typically fails at achieving their proscribed mission.[12] Second, I outline the two basic 
approaches to operationally fulfilling this strategy through either conventional or unconventional 
forces. I argue given the December 2011 withdrawal date, command and control issues, 
organizational inhibitions, and costs associated with conventional forces, that the strategic utility 
found in SOF as an alternate application of military power can successfully fit into SI theory, and 
provide us with a better approach in practice given the particularities of this case. Third, I 
introduce the Gant mode, as proposed by Major Jim Gant in his widely read paper, “One Tribe at 
a Time,” as a real-time means to prosecute the strategy at an operational and tactical level, 




Afghanistan—and therefore, leveraging the vast strategic utility of SOF, instead of painfully 
integrating general purpose forces (GPF) into a COIN strategy, which has proven to be less than 
successful in most cases, not to mention extremely costly. The forth and final section presents 
some concluding remarks and considerations for shifting to such an approach.  
Literature Review  
Strategic Interaction Theory 
Data collected by the Correlates of War Project (maintained since 1963) has identified over “464 
wars that occurred between 1816 and the end of the twentieth century, of which only 79 (17 
percent) were “conventional” interstate conflicts between the regular armed forces of nation 
states, while 385 (just under 83 percent of recorded conflicts) were civil wars and 
insurgencies.”[13] In How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Arreguin-Toft 
focuses on 202 asymmetric conflicts fought between 1816 and 2003 in order to decipher how the 
weak win wars in such environments. These statistics, coupled with numerous government and 
academic publications citing increased concerns with regard to global warming, youth bulges, 
contested commons, infectious diseases, and ungoverned territories, only exacerbate the potential 
for warfare to continue at the pace and trajectory measured.  The following figures show some 





Figure 1: In this chart Arreguin-Toft  shows the percentage of asymmetric conflict victories by type of 





Figure 2: Despite the overall strong-actor victories in asymmetric conflict since 1800, Arreguin-Toft 




These trends show a very interesting dynamic in asymmetric environments where strong actors 
are losing more and more over time.[16] Arreguin-Toft notes that “realist international relations 
theory leads us to believe that in a two-actor conflict, the larger the ratio of forces favors one 
actor the more quickly and decisively that actor will win” (as seen in Figure 1).[17] However, 
“strong actors lost nearly 30 percent of all conflicts in which they out-powered their adversaries 
by a factor of at least 5:1.”[18] He notes that “when the aggregate data are divided into [these] 
discrete time periods, the expected correlation between power and victory becomes significantly 
less useful as a guide to policy.”[19] In this sense, perhaps size does not matter.  
Arreguin-Toft still takes into account other theoretical frameworks— like that of relative power, 
the nature of the actor, arms diffusion, and interest asymmetry—as reasons associated with the 
charted trend. He speculates that there are various historical explanations (drawing comparisons 
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) for the latter. For instance:  
Perhaps the strong actors won because of their technological advantage: artillery, 
firearms, and blue-water navies must have been tremendous force multipliers. 
Perhaps the strong actor defeats concentrated in the last period were due to the 
rise of national self-determination as a norm of interstate politics? …We might 
also observe that after World War I and especially World War II, the number of 
authoritarian strong actors declined. And after 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed 
and ceased to be authoritarian actor in interstate politics. If authoritarian strong 
actors fight asymmetric conflicts better than democratic strong actors, perhaps the 
nature of the actor explains the trend.[20] 
After a thorough analysis of these other probabilities, he argues that “although relative power 
matters, the interaction of the strategies actors use matters more than how much power they have 
in the start of the conflict;” therefore, the “best predictor of asymmetric conflict outcomes is 
strategic interaction.”[21] This theory is broken down into two parts, direct and indirect, and 
contends that “when actors employ similar approaches (direct-direct or indirect-indirect), relative 
power explains the outcome: strong actors will win quickly and decisively. When actors employ 
opposite strategic approaches (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), weak actors are much more 
likely to win, even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn’t.”[22] 
Arreguin-Toft follows Liddell-Hart’s definition stating that strategy “is an actor’s plan for using 
armed forces to achieve military or political goals.”[23] Such goals can be achieved, he explains, 
through the strong actor’s application of “offensive strategies” via conventional attack and 
barbarism, or “defensive strategies,” via conventional defense and guerilla warfare. But what is 












Figure 3: Expected effects of strategic interaction on conflict outcomes as presented by Arreguin-
Toft.[24] 
The direct strategic approach, applied through conventional attack and defense, targets an 
“adversary’s armed forces with the aim of destroying or capturing the adversary’s physical 
capacity to fight, thus making will irrelevant.”[25] On the other hand, an indirect strategic 
approach, through barbarism or guerrilla warfare, is most often aimed at destroying the 
adversary’s will to resist, thus making physical capacity irrelevant.[26] Arreguin-Toft contends 
that:  
Same approach interactions (indirect-indirect or direct-direct) imply defeat for the 
weak actors because there is nothing to mediate or deflect a strong actor’s power 
advantage. Barring a battlefield miracle, these interactions should therefore be 
resolved in proportion to the force applied. By contrast, opposite-approach 
interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) imply victory for weak actors 
because the weak refuse to engage where the strong actor has a power advantage 
(i.e. on the latter’s terms). They therefore tend to be protracted, and time favors 
the weak.[27] 
Perhaps one of the most challenging factors when considering the situation in Afghanistan is 
noting the almost completely unchecked border and sanctuary with Pakistan across the British 
demarcated Durand Line. As Arreguin-Toft notes in the Soviet case, external support was a 









For instance, the initial Soviet-Afghan strategy was that of conventional offense against a 
guerilla operation (an opposite, direct-indirect approach), but they shifted to a barbarism strategy 
around 1981 during the Panjsher IV campaign (thus, equalizing the approach to indirect-
indirect). One could speculate, based on the statistics presented by Arreguin-Toft, that the Soviet 
strategy would be more effective in subduing the asymmetric foe. But as the Soviet Union 
expanded its operations, it became increasingly dependent on supporting conventional logistics 
and communications—primarily through air-mobile assets, and as a result their overall 
effectiveness declined. Not only had the Muhajadeen adjusted tactics, exploiting the various base 
targets as a result of increased lines of communication and supply, but the topography of the 
country presented a natural adversary all unto itself.  
Arreguin-Toft concludes that the barbarism strategy was in part an “explanatory factor” as there 
was a limited mission established. He further suggests that the “territory of Afghanistan is 
245,000 square miles; and even acknowledging that the Soviets only needed to control some 
lesser portion of that, they did not have enough troops [with] which to do it.”[30] But still, why 
did this indirect-indirect approach not work—especially since a barbarism strategy did not cause 
any vulnerability to the political situation in the Soviet Union, while it should have devastated 
the logistical, communications, and intelligence capabilities of the Muhajadeen and the 
supporting population? Arreguin-Toft explains that:  
The very real destruction of Afghan infrastructure and the mass killings and 
forced emigration of peasants did hurt the Mujahideen, but most … managed to 
reorganize themselves and their resources to compensate. After 1983 they began 
to rely more for intelligence on sympathizers within the DRA, and more on 
logistical support from foreign sympathizers. … In sum, the Afghan Civil War 
makes it clear that the more independent guerillas are of their popular support 
base due to outside support, the more insulated they will be from devastating 
effects of barbarism…[31] 
So what could be different for the United States? One significant difference comes to mind—our 
indirect approach through a population-centric COIN campaign, as opposed to the harsh and 
grotesque barbarism strategy that was wantonly directed against not only the Mujahideen by the 
Soviets, but the population writ large. Thus, the United States has adopted the correct same-
approach strategy as outlined by Arreguin-Toft, and vastly different from the Soviet model. Now 
the strategic thinking needs to take another layer off-the-onion, and pragmatically consider the 
type of force that is charged to conduct those operations—keeping the very important issues of 
time and resources close at hand, as these are not fungible when it comes to outlining military 
strategy.  
Conventional vs. Unconventional Applications 
The problem with our current population-centric COIN strategy is that is has become 




Army Special Forces during the 1960-70s, has become the primary mission of general purpose 
forces (GPF) since 2001.[33] This is especially problematic when considering the cost of 
conducting large-scale conventional operations and nation-building activities (as will be further 
discussed below).  
Political scientist Robert Pape recently indicated that there needs to be at least a 1:40 ratio of 
troops to civilians in order to properly secure the country.[34] John Nagl has further stated in a 
Frontline interview that withstanding classical COIN principles, there would need to be more 
than 600,000 troops on the ground to fully pacify the country. Currently, only two-thirds of those 
numbers are on the ground today.[35] The idea is that over time, the United States will be able to 
advise and train a competent national army and police force in order to compensate for the lack 
of coalition boots on the ground and provide their own security. However, the situation is neither 
sustainable politically, nor monetarily.  
For instance, per U.S. soldier costs for deployment are staggering—it now costs over 
US$775,000 a year to deploy a U.S. soldier or Marine in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[36] 
This is roughly three times as much than any war that America has been involved in the past. 
According to Linda Bilmes, co-author of The Three Trillion Dollar War, “in today’s dollars, the 
amount that we spent per troop in WWII was about 50k—we are spending 10 times that per 
troop in Iraq. … We can expect that the per troop cost in Afghanistan is higher than that. … I 
expect between 20 to 50 percent higher in upfront cost per troop.”[37] But why? One word—
logistics. Of course there are long-term-benefits, dependents (spouse and children housing and 
benefits), and other costs that are factored into this figure, but the bulk of expenditures comes at 
the expense of the topography, just as was the case for the Soviets.   
In terms of the topography, the supply routes in Afghanistan are very different from, say Iraq, for 
two reasons: first, Afghanistan is a very rural country ranging from steep valleys and rolling 
grasslands to the arduous mountain ranges of the Hindu Kush; and second, it is landlocked. 
Currently we are sending the majority of our supplies through Pakistan and opening up other 
supply routes through the North from several of the “stans” countries. This is far more expensive 
compared to having access to Gulf country ports (e.g., Kuwait), and modern thruways in Iraq. 
Such costs will continue to rise, commensurate with the increase in the number of ISAF forces. 
Through FY09 alone there has been more than $185 billion spent in the war in Afghanistan.[38]  
Therefore a conventional (GPF) force may very well be tasked to execute an indirect strategy 
against an irregular enemy, but may not have the same positive effect on its strategic goals as 
would an unconventional (SOF) element tasked in the same manner. Similarly, a SOF direct 
approach may not mesh well against an embedded and heavily defended conventional force. In 
the case of the current situation in Afghanistan in particular, reverting back to core mission 
competencies of SOF by working closely with indigenous forces could be done at a fraction of 
the cost of a broad, conventionally-based COIN campaign by GPF. Due to the shortcomings of 




given their small footprint. As will be presented later in this paper, Major Jim Gant’s model is 
one that fits well into the current literature supporting the strategic utility of SOF.  
The Strategic Utility of SOF 
A recent op-ed in the New York Times described foreign intervention in Afghanistan as “an 
imperial history that seems to be repeating itself with uncanny precision.”[39] Since the United 
States began its campaign in 2001, the perceptions on the population over time could easily fall 
within this statement.[40] Though the beginning of operations was marked by a heavy SOF 
emphasis that was successful in temporarily eliminating the opponent from the battlespace, as the 
conflict subsided, large-scale nation-building ensued that required a significant conventional 
force for security and population engagement.  However, as the insurgency grew, most 
conventional units were unable to adapt to the changing battlespace due to the restricting 
doctrine enmeshed in conventional Air-Land Battle warfare.  Therefore, SOF units—working as 
what Gant describes as Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs)–are a better option for Afghanistan’s 
near-term for the following reasons: the nature of SOF as an unconventional force, and the 
strategic utility SOF harnesses as both a direct and indirect means to engage asymmetric 
actors.[41] 
Christopher Lamb defines SOF as “what conventional forces are not.” In other words, “Special 
operations are those that conventional forces cannot accomplish or undertake without 
unacceptable levels of risk and expense of resources”—both are relevant when in comes to 
dealing with tribes in Afghanistan, and the amount of time it will take to do so.[42] The level of 
risk attached to instilling the image of an occupier with an influx of conventional forces is easily 
gleaned in a country strongly allergic to such a heavy foreign presence. As mentioned before, the 
massive amount of blood and treasure needed to conduct conventional operations shows the 
difference between these two distinct applications of force.  
But when considering Colin Gray’s concept of strategic utility of special operations,[43] the 
question arises as to whether or not SOF has been applied effectively in Afghanistan with regard 
to the directed mission. The short answer is no they have not, as the majority of operations 
conducted by SOF have been kinetic in nature and in support of broader conventional operations. 
Therefore, by not harnessing the strategic utility of SOF, the prospect for SI to be successful 
becomes limited, based on either the conventional-heavy and costly indirect approach through 
GPF COIN and the kinetic-centric SOF direct approach.[44] This is not the best application of SI 
theory in the “Petri dish” of asymmetric conflict.  
However, there are portions of the literature which suggest that SOF must become a part of the 
broader conventional campaign in order for there to be any strategic dividends.[45] Yet, there are 
numerous historical cases that demonstrate SOF can be an unconventional force that effectively 
integrates with indigenous forces as force multipliers in an economy-of-force scenario: El 
Salvador, 1980-1994; Philippines 2001-present; and even Afghanistan October 2001-Feburary 




value as an economy of force element.[47] Moreover, an immediate cultural awareness and 
language skills are core competencies harnessed by SOF, specifically Army Special Forces 
teams, which correlate with the necessary “granular knowledge” that are necessary for situational 
awareness throughout Afghanistan.[48] 
But the latter attributes have been placed on the proverbial back-burner, as Gant himself 
explained that his Operational Detachment Delta’s (ODA’s) mission was simply “to kill and 
capture anti-coalition members.” This is hardly a strategic application of SOF, and is purely 
direct in nature. Though SOF may be supporting a broader conventional effort, as outlined by 
James Kiras, the indirect capabilities described by Lamb and Tucker have been placed by the 
wayside.[49] To “kill and capture” enemy forces is something that any conventional infantry unit 
can accomplish; in other words, this is a blatant misuse of resources. Broader policy or strategic 
guidance was, and has been, lacking throughout the past eight years– perhaps this is still the case 
today. Only a small fraction of units like Gant’s adapted correctly to the environment early in the 
conflict. More can be done in this arena.  
Applying such a strategy would shift SOF from a dependent, supporting role—which harnesses a 
low level of strategic utility and potential misuse of SOF altogether. A recent Wall Street Journal 
article describing the application of SOF (and conventional forces, for that matter) in 
Afghanistan depicts this low return on SOF’s strategic utility by directly supporting conventional 
forces in a COIN campaign, and does not bode well with a population-centric COIN approach:  
U.S. Special Operations Forces ordered an air strike that killed at least 27 
civilians in southern Afghanistan. … [such a misguided operation] underscored 
the risks of the expanding use of Special Operations Forces, whose primary 
mission is hunting down Taliban, as the leading edge of the fight against 
insurgents. Many Special Operations missions by their very nature emphasize the 
use of violent force, and coalition officials say that they have led to a string of 
recent success against valuable targets. By contrast, operations now being carried 
out by conventional forces, such as Marines fighting in Marjah, place a greater 
emphasis on protecting ordinary people.[50] 
William H. McRaven describes the importance of special operations theory stating, “A 
successful special operation defies conventional wisdom by using a small force to defeat a much 
larger or well entrenched opponent.”[51] He argues that a SOF can reduce the “frictions of war 
to a manageable level,” and “by minimizing these frictions the special operations force can 
achieve relative superiority over the enemy.”[52] But when SOF units are utilized in this manner, 
the frictions of war increase and relative superiority for other operations—indirect in the case of 
Gant—are lost.  
Moreover, the general perception of the force becomes that of a video-game-like persona, and 
diminishes its practicality to the strategic thinker; this again follows a direct approach not 




independent, “warrior-diplomat” role, which achieves a proportionally greater strategic utility 
and interaction without minimizing the skill set to simply “violent [direct] force.” The need to 
revert to what Gant calls “influence without authority”—the most reliable and lasting influence 
that happens by acting as partners, not distant superiors, strangers or trigger-pullers—is 
imperative not only for a successful strategy in Afghanistan, but the future of SOF writ large. 
This is not to mention the ramifications of conventional forces becoming too SOF-like, and 
losing their principal warfighting luster.[53]  
What is needed, under Gant’s model of TETs is coordination between SOF and conventional 
forces between now and when SOF can take over the bulk of operations. During this transition 
period the tribal area would be ideally “turned into a Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA), 
where everyone and anyone who wanted to pass through would get approval from TET on the 
ground.”[54] Therefore, the chain of command would start with the SOF team, not the 
conventional force commander in that same area. This would be a good way forward in shifting 
to a SOF, indirect approach. This would be a polar shift from Kiras’ theory, as well as the 
conduct of SOF in a conventionally-dominated command environment. Yet, alleviating the 
potential of a drone strike or raid ruining 15 months of TET progress (not to mention placing the 
team in direct danger), emphasizes this very necessary change in coordination.[55]  
The difference is that most operations have been (in terms of SI theory) “direct-on-direct” in 
nature. In the beginning the SOF approach coupled with mass conventional firepower was very 
successful in its primary objective of rooting-out enemy forces. As far as SI theory is concerned, 
this was an effective application of strategy against a weak, asymmetrically-oriented actor—
which at the time attempted to fight largely head-on. Yet there wasn’t any strategic advantage 
derived from the relative superiority gained from such kinetic operations once the Taliban shifted 
its strategy to indirect (guerrilla warfare), and the United States stuck to its direct—and more 
conventionally-based—playbook.[56] The economy of force has, therefore, been in favor of the 
Taliban; the calculus needs to change, not only to turn the tides in the southern and eastern 
regions of the country, but also to scale back the extensive and resource-intensive conventional 
force that is currently deployed.  
Going Indirect-Indirect: “Influence without Authority” 
A famous maxim in the region is that “we have the watch, but they have the time.”[57] As has 
been argued in various arenas throughout the duration of this conflict, the political will of the 
United States is finite, and as described by the current Afghanistan policy, there may only be 18 
months to effectively implement General McChrystal’s (now General Petraeus’) plan. Clearly, 
the latter is not indicative of the former in the sense that the time remaining does not match with 
a COIN strategy that will take decades to come to full fruition. But the situation presents an 
opportunity to shift from a primarily conventional- based effort, to one that is centralized around 
a smaller footprint as depicted by Gant. Such a shift in strategy could—as suggested 
previously—offer a favorably disproportionate return on military investment, and will represent 




Policy analyst David Rittgers explained that the “fundamental element to any long-term solution 
in Afghanistan falls upon the tribes”—the oldest and most enduring self-governing unit in that 
country.[59] Otherwise, “if [the United States] takes away this basic building block of 
Afghanistan society, then any peace that we impose will be a temporary one at best [emphasis 
added].”[60] And with a tenuous border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where dozens 
of ethnic groups, speaking dozens of languages, reside, the situation becomes more grave.  
This very point has been eloquently reinforced by Gant throughout his paper, “One Tribe at a 
Time,” where he describes tribes as the most important military, political and cultural unit in the 
country, and are therefore hallmark to sustaining any level of stability in the current COIN 
campaign.[61] Given what Major Gant describes as a “tactical employment of small, well-trained 
units that, when combined with a larger effort, will have positive strategic implications,” which 
extends beyond the common attributes found on a battlefield defined by a conventional presence. 
This type of model for Afghanistan is imperative as the fight steadily evolves toward the 
proposed deadline in eighteen months.[62]  
In his “Note to the Reader,” Gant explains that he drafted his paper prior to President Obama’s 
speech outlining the “way forward” in Afghanistan, establishing the 18-month deadline for U.S. 
combat forces to commence their withdrawal. With that said, there are clearly a plethora of 
issues that prevail on the ground in Afghanistan, but which for reasons of length and focus are 
not explicitly discussed in this article, but which are no less important and will exist beyond the 
December 2011 date.  
Generally speaking, Afghanistan is a country with a history and orientation that is fundamentally 
different from any Westphalian-modeled nation-state. Importantly, if these issues, along with the 
core elements of statecraft, are not addressed, then any long-term regional or international 
relationships will be absent, as the engagement will not be sustained between other nation-state 
or international institutions. For now, though, Seth Jones presents an appropriate way forward 
when considering the political dynamic in his recent Foreign Affairs article, “It Takes the 
Villages.” He argues that “[t]he current top-down state-building and counterinsurgency efforts 
must take place alongside bottom-up programs, such as reaching out to legitimate local leaders to 
enlist them in providing security and services at the village and district levels.”[63] However, 
there are some other very important considerations to keep in mind:  
 Confronting the broader cross-border infiltration with Pakistan; 
 A lack of a viable justice system and rule of law; broad political issues that range 
from the legitimacy of a centralized national government to rampant levels of 
corruption that plague politics throughout the system; and the prevalence of 
warlords and how to absorb or retract them into a functional system; 
 The monumental opium problem that not only fuels the insurgency with vast 
monetary resources, but provides the local population with a dependable 




 And lastly, the larger issue of how to establish a relevant, coherent, functional and 
trusted Afghan National Army (ANA) and police force (ANP).  
Gant prepares his analysis based off of his personal experience while serving with Operational 
Detachment Alpha 316 (ODA 316) working intimately with the Malik Noorafzhal’s tribe (in the 
Pashtun belt). He summarizes the experience as follows:  
We demonstrated month-in-and-month-out that a small effective fighting force 
could unite with an Afghan tribe, become trusted and respected brothers-in-arms 
with their leaders and families, and make a difference in the U.S. effort in 
Afghanistan. In doing so, we discovered what I believed to be the seed of 
enduring success in that country.”[64] 
In fact, it would behoove the United States to embrace a plan that “will not only work,” 
according to Gant, “but will help to ease the need for … larger numbers of U.S. soldiers being 
deployed to Afghanistan.”[65] The enemy may indeed have the time, “However, we can turn 
time into an ally if we engage and partner with the tribes and, most importantly, demonstrate our 
commitment to them” without an expensive watch that equates to extensive manpower and 
resources.[66] Gant boldly suggests that once “we gain the respect and trust of one tribe, in one 
area, there will be a domino effect [that will] spread throughout the region and beyond. One tribe 
will eventually become 25 or even 50 tribes.”[67] 
In order to achieve such ends, Gant proposes the formal implementation of what he coins, Tribal 
Engagement Teams (TETs). These TETs would be largely autonomous, and allow broad 
flexibility in responding to fresh, actionable intelligence without having to filter through an 
extensive chain of command. These teams would not only serve as solutions at a local level, but 
“with an eye to integrate with regional and national government representatives” as well.[68] 
The basic tenet as described by Gant is that “[t]his plan requires a small group of men who can 
comprehend the extensive networks, influences and idiosyncrasies of the mission and the 
environment.”[69] Other reasons why TETs would be an appropriate SI theory approach via 
indirect are:  
 TETs can effectively separate the insurgent from the population. This would not 
only disrupt Taliban movement and their ability to surge in certain areas, but 
challenge their sanctuary writ large.[70] 
 A force with individuals who harness a “special gift for cross-cultural competency 
and building rapport,” as well as who “like to fight and spend countless months, 
even years living in harsh circumstances,” is necessary. Again, a trait outside of 
the proverbial conventional box.  
 TETs can provide immediate and “real security” for the villages that they are 




 TETs can work in coordination with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 
facilitating tactical civil action programs.[72] 
 TETs can provide a very effective tactical PSYOPS campaign, where tribes can 
heavily counter Taliban propaganda.[73] 
 TETs can provide a bridge between the tribe and all levels of government.  
In this sense, SOF clearly offers what Adm. Olson, commander of the Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM), would describe as a “different flavor” from tactics, techniques and 
procedures through a more “refined doctrine.” He further notes that—and as is suggested by 
Gant’s proposal for TETs—that SOF “make a greater relative difference in small teams in 
remote places.”[74]  
Why Tribes? 
At the beginning of Colonel Harry Summers’ book, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the 
Vietnam War, he cites a conversation between himself and his North Vietnamese counterpart, 
Colonel Tu, in Hanoi, April 1975: “You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said 
Summers. The North Vietnamese commander pondered his remark for a moment and replied, 
“That may be so, but it also irrelevant.”[75] For the United States, it may be that we hold ground 
in Afghanistan and are heavily involved in kinetic and non-kinetic operations throughout the 
country. But just as in Vietnam, that also becomes irrelevant when it comes to the political, 
economic and social intricacies around the tribal belt.  
Tribal engagement is essential for avoiding the perils of Vietnam, by implementing the 
appropriate SI approach with an indirect strategy through the application of SOF.[76] This is the 
case for a variety of reasons. In particular, the Pashtun tribes, which represent the majority ethnic 
group, are important to engage for two primary reasons: “first, this group has dominated Afghan 
politics and society for hundreds of years … and second, the Pashtun identity is important 
because the Afghan-Pakistani border divided ethnic Pashtuns almost in half.”[77] For these 
reasons alone, an active tribal engagement campaign will assist in pacifying many of the areas 
from the Taliban’s hold. But even in areas that are inhabited by other tribal groups, tribal 
engagement would prove effective.  
The Taliban is certainly wasting no time, as they have adapted to the U.S. presence and its 
message of democracy and peace. Whether in sequence, or separate, from blatant intimidation 
campaigns, the Taliban have engaged in a staunch IO campaign that aligns their primary 
objectives with that of the broader Pashtun identity by reinventing themselves as a part of the 
Pashtun nationalist cause. They want to “liberate the country from foreign invaders.”[78] And as 
more U.S. troops enter the country, and validate the Taliban’s “occupier” narrative, the ability 
for the United States to regain its IO momentum becomes ever more challenging. The Taliban 
are winning on that front, and still continue to apply classical intimidation tactics like 
kidnappings, taxation and assassinations of mid-level and local government officials as well as 




The United States must regain the initiative in the “war of ideas”—and a broad TET campaign, 
by partnering with the tribes, would be an appropriate response. After all, the Taliban have found 
the tribal approach quite helpful to their cause. As described by Seth Jones, the Taliban have 
more effectively reached out to the population by appointing “commanders who come from local 
sub-tribes or clans. They frequently reach out to tribes and other local communities that have 
been marginalized by those favored by the government.”[79] Gant’s proposal thus provides a 
viable means for countering these efforts by the Taliban. Other key reasons that Gant provides 
for partnering TETs with tribes are as follows:  
 Partnering with the tribes is directly related to protecting the population.  
 In order to fully embrace a productive, population-centric counterinsurgency 
strategy, this must be an accepted stipulation: tribes are structurally conducive to 
providing protection to the population.  
 This protection is not only committed to physical security and land rights, but it 
covets the virtues of honor—a core attribute in tribal society. As Gant explains, a 
tribe is a “natural” democracy.  
 Though the issues of civil and human rights in the western sense cannot be 
parallel at any level, when it comes to Afghan shuras and jirgas (tribal councils), 
“every man’s voice has a chance to be heard;”[80] and a tribal member “lives in a 
regional world where day-to-day military strength means the difference between 
survival and being overrun by other tribal elements whoever they might be.”[81] 
Members of a TET would be most appropriate to engage in such meetings, and 
become integrated in the process.  
 There is nominal, if any, concern about “country” as would be understood through 
a western lens,[82] and “[t]he Pashtun tribes will fight any and all outsiders, and 
refuse to accept being ruled by a central government;” [83] 
 The psyche of a tribal warrior—around the world—holds value in “upholding 
codes of honor and avoiding shameful humiliation;” all want to gain honor for 
themselves, their lineage, clan and tribe;[84] and a deep understanding of Pashtun 
tribal code, “Pashtunwali,” is essential “for the success of TETs and overall U.S. 
strategy in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and beyond.”[85] 
 As indicated by Thomas Barfield, president of the American Institute of 
Afghanistan Studies, the Pashtunwali is a code of honor and conduct that stresses 
“having solutions take place outside of the state.”[86] 
Given the proposed American timeline, as well as the fact that “most [successful] insurgencies 
have taken between 11 to 14 years to complete,” the TET program is a viable avenue of approach 
beyond the 18-month deadline.[87] And since the average time to conduct a COIN campaign 
clearly falls outside of the current U.S. mandate, “the indigenous forces will eventually have to 
win the war on their own, and must develop the ability to do so.”[88] If using the coveted “clear, 




areas as possible over the next 18 months (e.g., Helmand) in order to pave the way for SOF to 
follow-on to implement the latter two portions of the strategy. As described by Gant:  
a small number of TETs—given enough time to train a Tribal Security Force 
(TSF) and the ability to call for U.S. air support and aerial re-supply and a U.S. 
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in an emergency—could conduct the “hold and 
build” portion of this strategy with a very limited footprint. … Training and 
building relationships with leaders of the tribe will be permanent fixes in large 
areas of rural Afghanistan. We will be able to stay there for the long-haul with 
very little support once the systems are in place and the TSPs (Arbakai) are well 
training and gained their trust [sic].  
As it is, our SOF presence is increasing—perhaps preempting such a shift in strategy. A recent 
report stated that “[t]he Army expects its expanded Special Operations HQ in Mazer-e-Sharif to 
occupy 70,000 square meters … [additionally] the U.S. military is on a building spree, spending 
hundreds of millions of dollars on wartime encampments. By one count, America and its allies 
now have 700 bases in Afghanistan.”[89]  
So with that said, how does this model as presented by Gant, fall into the matrix of prevailing, 
scholarly theoretical models of SOF as a strategic force? First, there is a cultural dynamic to 
consider. As mentioned before, a SOF is defined as a force that conducts “operations that 
conventional forces can not.”[90] Therefore, as presented by Lamb and Tucker, two of the four 
key characteristics of a SOF are that, one, it has unorthodox approaches; and two, 
unconventional training and equipment. Luttwak also talked about the “basics” in Son Tay. To 
paraphrase, he signified that there is a high-value in “training together, working together and 
fighting together.”[91] Lamb and Tucker’s two traits, as well as Edward Luttwak’s point about 
SOF having a special esprit de corps that allow a SOF unit to engender a natural sense of 
cohesion with an indigenous force—in this case, a tribe—makes SOF the best fit for such 
operations. Gant points this out, stating “a Special Forces ODA can understand an Afghan tribe 
because we ourselves are a tribe.”[92]  
The cultural continuity predisposed to SOF teams and tribes makes for a natural working 
relationship; cultural integration becomes second nature.[93] They are effective force multiples 
for working with tribes—due to their economy-of-force mission that is not dependent on large 
scale logistics chains, and the natural ability of SOF to integrate well in the tribal culture. 
However, SOF are also able to apply an unconventional, SI-indirect response through what 
Arreguin-Toft describes as a defensive, guerilla strategy. Not only is a small, SOF detachment 
conducive to the warrior ethos exhibited in the tribal culture, but also their small size allows for 
what Gant calls an “acceptable level of integration.”[94] In other words, a large conventional 
contingent of U.S. soldiers—even at the platoon level—would quickly alienate themselves based 
on SOPs (erecting mini-fire bases, walking around with armor and Kevlar, etc.)[95] At the 
strategic level, a large footprint would translate into the perception of an “occupation,” and the 




this concept via SI when an asymmetric environment favors the weak actor, when the stronger 
counterpart relies upon muscle and technology for a long duration. [96] Thus, a conventionally-
oriented, indirect approach is not appropriate for the mission. In the end, however, it is not the 
TET that will secure the tribe, rather the “tribe will have to secure the tribe,” which will not tie 
the United States down to the country forever.[97] 
Concluding Remarks  
To borrow from a recent paper by Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia and Alexander Thier published 
in Foreign Affairs, “As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed in 2009, Afghanistan 
does not need to become “a Central Asian Valhalla.” Yet a Central Asian Somalia would 
presumably not suffice.” And in order to overt such an outcome, and not commit abundant 
resources toward an unrealistic “Valhalla,” a thoughtful shift in strategy is needed.[98] Just the 
same, aside from the economy of force and functionality of a “small footprint,” once American 
forces begin to disengage, there are some unintended consequences that must be considered in 
taking the tribal engagement approach proposed by Gant.  
First is the potential entanglement in tribal, clan and sub-clan vendettas. Working with tribes, 
and potentially tribal warlords, can ensnare the United States into involving itself with deeply-
divided historical disputes between these entities, which in return have no strategic value for the 
United States.[99] In effect, the United States would be doing the dirty work at the behest of 
these tribes on the dime of the U.S. tax payers, and more importantly, misapplying the most 
precious resource in America’s arsenal—its forces. Taking on such a venture on any vast scale—
vast meaning embedding multiple SOF groups into tribal areas as TETs—could very well lead us 
down such slippery a slope.   
Though there are many examples, Gant actually presents an anecdote in his writings which 
exemplifies the potential for becoming stewards to such devices, when describing his support for 
Noorafzhal’s tribes in reconciling land disputes between the “highland” and “lowland” tribes:  
He told me he had given the highlanders 10 days to comply with the request or he 
and his men would retake it by force. … Could I afford to get involved in internal 
tribal warfare? What were the consequences if I did? With the Tribe? With the 
other tribes in the area? With my own chain of command. … I made the decision 
to support him.[100] 
Nevertheless, it was only after fighting and living so close to this tribe that Gant able to observe 
“the depth and power of the existing … tribal system … [and grasp] the absolute necessity of 
working with and bonding with the tribal leader—man-to-man, warrior-to-warrior.”[101] There 
is nothing new with either the dilemma of becoming too entrenched in the internal affairs in a 
particular society, nor garnering the success of working so closely with these groups. This can be 




Still, having a deep understanding of the local dynamic—the human terrain and ethnography—is 
central to a SOF commander’s (and individual soldier’s) effect on the area; both in terms of 
operational and strategic utility.[102] And when it comes to Afghanistan in particular, “engaging 
the tribes and understanding tribalism at its core is the surest and ‘lightest-footprint’ opportunity 
we have to protect the tribes—the cultural and political foundation of Afghanistan—where they 
live, one tribe at a time.”[103] 
The current shift in command from General McChrystal to General Petraeus adds increased 
pressure on the policy that now is a year-out from the designated timeline. Since the prompt 
transition of command, there has been increased demand on clarity on the troop deadline, as well 
as the COIN policy writ large. Many in Congress and elsewhere are questioning whether the 
December 2011 deadline is really hyperbole, or a strict timeline on U.S. commitment. Regardless 
of the previous intent of the December 2011 deadline, the unfortunate situation that has led to the 
ousting of General McChrystal presents the Administration and General Petraeus a unique 
opportunity to clarify what the date means, and how forces may be utilized there afterward.  
This is particularly significant as the status quo not only hinders U.S. flexibility in conducting 
effective tactical operations that exhibit lasting strategic effect, but openly displays to America’s 
foes that hinging their strategies on an asymmetric basis—whether on the low-end of the 
spectrum through guerrilla operations, or even cyber warfare and systems disruptions at the 
higher-end—is an effective model to follow when countering a stronger adversary. For the 
United States there is growing importance in having better fortitude to operate under such 
conditions, as those have, and will, become instrumental to current and future U.S. military 
operations. As described by Arreguin-Toft, “The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric 
conflict depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use.” So far, the weak 
have the winning strategy.  
However, Arreguin-Toft’s analysis would suggest that an indirect approach applied by the strong 
actor via guerrilla warfare, or in this case tribal engagement through SOF, would present an ideal 
framework when conducting operations against the Taliban, which have been conducing a 
comprehensive insurgency since late 2001. Therefore, merging the networked ODA or “A-
Team” concept as applied during the first push into Afghanistan through air and fires support 
(direct), with Major Jim Gant’s model of tribal engagement (indirect), enhances this ideal 
framework for Afghanistan and other potential conflicts in strongly ethnic based, and weakly 
governed areas along the coined “Arc of Instability”—hence, the strategic interaction becomes 
similar, and in essence symmetrical, with an irregular enemy.[104] 
The term “perilous slogs” appears in the title of an article authored by Rajiv Chandrasekaran on 
the eve of the Marjah operation, and describes the density of the ongoing kinetic operations.[105] 
Coincidently, Lucien Vanderbrouche titled his book Perilous Options when considering the 
application of SOF in U.S. foreign policy (many of the cases being direct in nature). With Gant’s 
model, the slogs of working, eating, sleeping and fighting with these tribes are not only pertinent 




counterpart maneuvering across the countryside in Marjah and beyond.[106] However, one 
harnesses broader and more sustaining strategic outcomes than the other.  
But like any approach, there are flaws—as mentioned earlier, there are no silver bullets. Some of 
the most significant are logistics—which are no better for a SOF element; however, they still do 
not have as long of a coat-tail that a conventional unit would have. But supplying and reinforcing 
these teams will still constitute vast logistical hurdles. Another is having the ability to sustain the 
deployment of multiple Special Forces A-teams, as a part of the TET endeavor. Clearly, an 
increase in SOF would be needed—but simply stating such a need is different from recruiting, 
training, and equipping those (including advanced cultural and language skills) who would be 
considered qualified to become a special operator; there is thus only a finite amount of force. 
Moreover, dedicating the majority of those forces to one area of operation (AOR) will degrade 
the presence, missions and cultural and language skills unique to that particular group’s regional 
area.[107] 
In the end, the key to achieving strategic goals will be to adapt against a heavily ingrained 
organizational command structure that is not compatible with such shifts in strategy. Yet, 
security should not be diminished just to uphold bureaucratic formalities—those who will exploit 
those values and systems by asymmetric means are well aware of such inhibitions.  
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